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Abstract: The paper established a new sealed bargaining mechanism based on the electronic business negotiation
model and considering the opaqueness of information on demand and supply. Using the supply function and
demand function to analyze the behavior rule during the course of the price change,

in the paper we established

and proved a series of intersecting chord theorems about concave supply function and demand function,

thus we

got a transaction mechanism of negotiating prices that manufacturers and distributors submitted the supply and
demand according to node gradually recursion algorithm after the first offer made by the e-commerce platform,
And proved the negotiated price converged to the equilibrium price of supply and marketing.

Keywords: Bargaining Mechanism，Negotiated Pricing，Node Gradually Recursion Algorithm

1.

INTRODUCTION
As a kind of interactive two-way communication channel, network bridges the communication gap

between the subjects in the market, and realizes trade negotiation and trading activities under different
asynchrony with low transaction cost. The development of electronic commerce makes bargaining mechanism
innovation, especially the loose group which the supply chain consists of a plurality of enterprises, hope that
negotiate on trade through the electronic commercial platform, in order to identify common transaction price
and the respective number. Recently, some electronic commercial platform which started to launch shopping
assistant or shopping agency with some negotiation functions[9] , which puts forward a new problem to the
research of pricing mechanism.
From researches on pricing model under electronic commerce we can see, most of scholars quoted the
manufacturer's learning mechanism to solve it. Gupta et al. (2002) established a Dutch auction model based on
network environment, using the Markov decision process model, and Q - learning algorithm, only the price
game situation is discussed[1]. Carvalhbo et al. ( 2003 ) using Kalman filtering method, gives a heuristic
algorithm to guide the future pricing with previous transaction information, which cannot adjust the current
pricing timely[2]
Raju et al. (2005) consider monopoly electronic retailer's pricing and inventory problems, price are made
by the seller, the buyer obtain products according to the bid price level[3]; There are also some other scholars
study online reverse auction problem[4][5], they believe that online reverse auction is becoming a new vitality
way to trade, with the rising status of buyer (including individual, organization or enterprise) ,the buyers is
gradually playing a leading role in trade. Tang Qiusheng etc. (2012) established MeRCRM quantity discount
game model based on the theory of Stackelberg, which achieved the purpose to improve the sales and the
manufacturer, retailer's income[6]; Based on data driven, He Zhigan etc. (2011) set model view controler (MVC)
as the basic framework, presented a new price pricing model on online shopping mall which describe reference
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price trend chart very well[7].
These studies have rarely considered that under the electronic commerce environment, trade state changed by
both common decision-making behavior is a game between buyer and seller matchmaking transaction. The
traditional auction theory mainly for a fixed quantity of auction through the auction price formation, which is
usually high value and less number items, the affect of auction transaction volume is less considered[8]. But for
the large scale supply or demand problem of many manufacturers or distributors, it needs to consider the
relationship between trading volume and price.
This paper studies the manufacturers and dealers in the product transaction, both sides under the
incomplete information game environment make t their initial price and quantity to maximize their individual
interests, and repeated comparison together in the third party trading system based on the sealed private
valuation, and finally form a transaction price and transaction volume.
2.

MODEL ANALYSIS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Because of the random factors and incomplete information transparency, from the consumer market to the

dealer, and then to the manufacturers, the information from demand information transfer to order information,
and then form to supply information, there is bullwhip effect of supply and demand, so both sides in the transfer
price determined and the corresponding quantity could not coordinated, performance on a transfer price, it
existences quantitative differences in optimal product identified by both sides, both parties to determine the
optimal product quantity differences according to the minimum quantity, the minimum number of transactions is
not able to achieve the maximum benefits of the whole supply chain. So in the supply chain alliance, the leading
party or third party determine the optimal market sales and initial transfer price according to the maximum
benefits of the whole supply chain , under the electronic commerce environment, it is very easy to implement
alliance member according to the transfer price and order quantity, a closed price negotiation will be carry out in
the electronic commerce platform, then form a new price and feedback to all members, all members submit new
quantity according to the new price and benefit maximization, like this repeated negotiation ,finally realize
interest distribution mechanism, and this price reflects interest distribution mechanism and relationship in the
alliance. This transaction mechanism is similar to the trading agent with negotiation function mentioned in
Strbel Michael (2000)[9], the core problem is the design of interest distribution mechanism, so that the sealed
price matchmaking platform can reflect the characteristics and requirements of the sale of both buyers and
sellers, realize the price and quantity both sides can accept. This paper holds that the bargaining ability of both
buyers and sellers and their respective demand or supply elasticity related.
Hypothesis
1 ) many manufacturers in auction platform are regarded as a whole, the same to dealers, that is, only one
manufacturer and one distributor, both sides need to clinch a deal;
2) the relative elasticity greater, the advantage of interests distribution more;
3 ) Both manufacturers and dealers determine their optimal quantity based on profit maximization;
4) manufacturers understand their supply function, and dealers know demand function, both buyers and
sellers know their own elastic but do not know each other's;
5 ) As the auction platform ,the third party can learn characteristics of supply function and demand function
on a certain degree through the relationship between the declared price and quantity after displaying price of
both sides;
6) Dealers purchase cycle is fixed constant T, manufacturers forecast production and delivery in [0,K]
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according to predict situation based on

x (t ) =

k2
4k1

t2 +

4 k1Q* − k2 K 2
4k1 K

t ， 0≤t ≤K

,dealers and

[10]

manufacturers make a auction match on day K , after closing the auction , the manufacturer can complement the
parts beyond expected. Because of the distribution process, the commodity will be served at the end of day T-K.
3.

SET NEGOTIATED PRICING MODEL
The paper established a new negotiation model and algorithm in electronic business environment, to realize

the supply and demand sides submit product quantity according to the price, and adjust the price further until it
reaches the bargain transaction requirement.
3.1 Gradually node recurrence Negotiated principle.
Facing a market price, whether manufacturer or dealer will determine supply and demand according to
maximize their own interests, that is, the supply function and demand function decided their response to price.
In order to describe the reaction condition, this paper use supply function and demand function to analyze both
sides behavior under the variable price.
3.1.1 Negotiated Pricing of linear demand and supply.
First assume that demand and supply curve are linear, the third party e-commerce platform gives the
product polling price, later become display price, due to the linear demand and supply, need only two times
submitted quantity according to price ,we can determine the linear demand function and supply function in the
electronic commerce platform:
The demand curve:

Q = D( p) =

The supply curve:

Q = D( p) =

D p −D p
D −D
2 1
1 2− 2
1p
p −p
p −p
1
2
1
2

D2 p1 − D1 p2
p1 − p2

−

D2 − D1
p1 − p2

p

(1)

(2)

By D(p)=S(p), we get the coordinates of the intersection, i.e. the equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity
(Figure 1 ):

( D2 − S 2 ) p1 − ( D1 − S1 ) p2
( D2 − D1 ) − ( S 2 − S1 )
D2 S1 − D1 S 2
Q* =
( D2 − D1 ) − ( S 2 − S1 )

p* =

(3)
(4)

3.1.2 Negotiated Pricing of nonlinear demand and supply.
This section study on nonlinear and concave demand and
supply curve, assume that demand function monotone reduced
and concave, that is, D '(Q ) < 0 and D ''(Q ) > 0 ; Supply function
monotone increasing and concave, that is S '(Q ) > 0 且 S ''(Q ) > 0 .
At this time, the line which connect any two points on each
given curve is no longer a demand or supply function, and the
node is not equilibrium price and quantity, but but pay attention
to two points line is the string of a concave function, we can
establish a series of theorems and corollaries as follows.
Theorem 1: If two intersected line are the chord of two

Figure 1 Negotiated Pricing of linear

curve
concave functions concave, and the slope of the lines is non zero, then the crossover point of the concave
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function is below the crossover point of their chord.
Proof: From the concave function definition we know, the function value of any point on the curve is less
than the function value of any point on the chord, that is, concave function curve is below its chord. Given line
segments l1 : y = α1 + β1 x ，( β1 > 0 ， x ∈ [ a , b ] ) and l2 : y = α 2 + β 2 x ，
( β 2 < 0 ， x ∈ [ a , b ] ) were chords of monotone reduced and concave
function

y = f ( x ), x ∈ [ a, b] and monotone increasing and concave
function y = g ( x), x ∈ [a, b] , as shown in figure 2,two lines intersect
to point N and curves intersect to point M.
For ∀x ∈ [a , b ] , we get f ( x ) < α1 + β1 x and g ( x ) < α 2 + β 2 x , and
curve intersection point M(xM, yM) meet function

y = f ( x ) and

y = g ( x ) , then, yM < α1 + β1 xM and yM < α 2 + β 2 xM , and point M must

Figure 2. concave functions & their
intersection chords

be below common line l1 , l2 .
Definition 1 (Cross Intersection Point Chord) Given two concave or convex function intersect at the
point M(x0, y0), linear l1 intersect with curve y = f ( x) at two points respectively A(x1, y1), B(x2, y2), linear l2
intersect with y = g ( x) at two points C(x3, y3), F(x4, y4), if x1< x0<x2, then the line segment AB is cross
intersection point chord of f ( x) relative to g ( x) , if x3> x0>x4, then the line segment CF is cross intersection
point chord of g ( x) relative to f ( x) .
Corollary 1 The crossover point of two cross intersection point chord is above intersection concave
function.
Proof From theorem 1 we know crossover point N of two cross intersection point chord is above the
concave function crossover point M, if N in the left lower side of g ( x) , then the chord CF in near N and
below g ( x) , which is contradict to concave function definition, in like manner, N will not in the lower right side
of f ( x) .
Theorem 2 The horizontal cross intersection point chord of intersection concave function intersect
with f ( x) and g ( x) at B ' and F ' respectively, then AB ' and CF ' are still the cross intersection point chord
of f ( x) and g ( x) , the crossover point is above the two concave function and below AB and CF .
Proof set the coordinates of B ' and F ' are B '( x2 ', yk ) and F '( x4 ', yk ) , from Theorem 2, we get yk > y0 ,
again, f(x) is increasing function and g(x) is reduce function, we reach x1 < x0 < x2 ' and x3 > x0 > x4 ' , by
definition 1, we know AB ' and CF ' are still the cross intersection point chord of f ( x) and g ( x) .
From Theorem 2, we get AB ' and CF ' intersect at M ' , M ' is above the two concave function.
Line AB ' is below AB , M ' is on AB ' ,then, M ' must be below AB ; Line CF ' is below CF , M ' is
on CF ' ,then, M ' must be below CF ,so M ' is below common AB and CF . Theorem proved.
If repeat operation according to theorem 2, we will get infinite pair of cross intersection point chord, and
their crossover point is below the last crossover point and above f ( x) and g ( x) , the collaring quadrilateral
formed by f ( x) , g ( x) and cross intersection point chord become more and more small, the outside diameter
tending to 0, thus, we reach the corollary as follows:
Corollary 2 ABk and CFk

are cross intersection point chords that intersecting concave functions f(x) and

g(x) generate after k times generation by the way of Theorem 2, and Mk (xk, yk) is the intersection point. ABk+1
and CFk+1, whose intersection point is Mk+1 (xk+1, yk+1), is the cross intersection point chords of f ( x) and
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g ( x) after k+1 times generation, M(x0, y0)is the intersection point of f ( x) and g ( x) , and the point range
Mk(xk, yk) ( k = 1, 2, 3,... ) will converge to M(x0, y0).
So by inference we can get a most useful way of automatic bargaining, by which the difficulty of making a
price resulted from incomplete information can be avoided, and transaction behavior of repeated bargaining on
the internet can be easily realized.
Usually, the price demand function p = D (Q ) and the price supply function p = S (Q ) are concave
functions, by which they can be taken as

f ( x) and g ( x) in the former theorem deduction. Suppose that

both sides of the participants are not clear about the response mode of his trade counterpart, and they know
nothing about the counterpart’s demand or supply function, in which condition equilibrium can be got only by
repeated tests. Line AB and CD could be taken as the lines connecting the two points which are formed
separately on demand function and supply function after offering price (twice) on the auction platform.
M (Q*, p*) shows the market’s equilibrium number and price, which also means the objective number and
price of the bargained transactions. Mk(Qk,pk)is the match point of price bargaining after k times of offering
prices on the auction platform and submitting available trade numbers. To get the point Mk(Qk,pk), firstly, get 2
points which represent (k-2)th and (k-1)th match prices and submitted numbers on supply function, and connect
these 2 points; secondly, get another 2 points which represent (k-2)th and (k-1)th match prices and submitted
numbers on demand function, and connect these 2 points; the intersection point of these 2 connecting lines is

Mk(Qk,pk). Among which k=3，4，5…, the 1st and 2nd displayed prices and submitting numbers are chords’ end
points of explorative demand function and supply
function
1). The condition when the equilibrium price is
between the initial prices p1 and p2
Just as Theorem 2, under the condition when the
initial prices p1 and p2 are located at each side of the
equilibrium price, the connecting line of the two demand
points and connecting line of the two supply points both
are cross intersection point chords. Suppose that the kth
and (k+1)th prices and numbers offered by the manufacturers Figure 3. Schematic diagram of negotiated pricing
if p * is between the p1 and p2
and distributors are separately the end points’ coordinate
values on cross intersection point chords CkFk and AkBk of the demand and supply curves (see figure 3), then the
ordinate value of Mk+2, which is the intersection point of the
intersecting chords CkFk and AkBk, is the kth match price pk+2
(i.e., the (k+2) th reported price in the price series) . With this
price, suppliers and buyers submit the demand number Dk+2
and supply number Sk+2 according to their own demand
function or supply function, which represent as point

Fk+2(Dk+2,pk+2) on the demand curve and point Bk+2 (Sk+2,
pk+2) on the supply curve. So then the new intersecting
chords CkFk+1 and AkBk+1 are got, whose intersection point is
the next match point Mk+3(Qk+3,pk+3). Through Theorem 2,
series {Mk(Qk, pk),k=3,4,5…}will converge to market’s

Figure 4. Schematic diagram of negotiated
equilibrium point M(Q*, p*), and the match price pk converges pricing if p1 > p2 > p *
to p*, submitting number Qk converges to Q*. In the actual
execution, the match is successful only if the difference of demand and supply of the kth price offering | Sk-Dk| is
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less than some set value.
2). The initial prices p1 and p2 are located above the equilibrium price
In this case, p1>p2>p*. After the display of the initial price series p1,p2, the manufacturers and distributors
submitted orderly the trade numbers they want according to these prices , therefore, the demand points A,B and
supply points C,F on prices p1,p2 all are above equilibrium point M(see figure 4). The intersection point

M3(Q3,p3) of the line AB and CF is the point on which makes a price match, that must be below the point M ,
supply curve S and demand curve D . The price p3 was the first match price, according that the manufacturers
and distributors submitted the new trade numbers and form new demand point E and supply point H, then, the
lines EF and HB formed the cross intersection point chords, so situation 2 changed to situation 1.
3). The condition when the initial prices p1 and p2 are located below the equilibrium price
In this case, p1<p2<p*. After the display of the initial price series p1,p2, the manufacturers and distributors
submit orderly the available trade numbers, and therefore the demand points A,B and supply points C,F on
prices p1,p2 are all below equilibrium point M(see figure 5).
The intersection point M3 of the line AB and CF is the point
on which a price match is made, must be below the point M
supply curve S and demand curve D, and the first match
price p3 ∈(p2, p*) is made above the horizontal line p = p2.
According to the price p3, the manufacturers and distributors
submit the available trade numbers to make the new demand
point E and new supply point H, and the line EF connecting
the demand points and line HB connecting the supply points

Figure 5. Schematic diagram of negotiated
are in accordance with AB and CF. The line EF and HB pricing if p1 < p2 < p *
intersects on M4(Q4, p4), and obviously there is a second
match price p4 ∈(p3, p*). Repeat the above work, we can get the displayed price series {pk}(k=3,4,5…) which
converges to p*.
Under these three conditions above, the displayed price series {pk}(k=3,4,5…) are all convergent
resembling convergence of Newton tangent method. Newton tangent method utilizes tangents and axis to form
recursive points, and converges fast. This paper utilizes chord intersection to form recursive points, with which
method it converges to the same order. Given the rather complex cost-benefit analysis during the companies’
matching process, the times of price matching must be reduced. The basic rules are that under the condition
when the demand differs considerably from the supply after the price is displayed for the first time, and the
distance between second displayed price and the first displayed price should be sufficient, not be too small or
too big. When the distance satisfies |p2 － p1|<| p* － p1|, the larger the distance is, the faster the convergence
speed will be. Such as in figure 5, the intersection point M3(Q3, p3) mounts at an accelerating rate when the
dotted line p = p2 translates upwards; when the distance is too large that

|p2 － p1|>| p*－ p1| , the condition of

negotiated pricing changes into the condition when first equilibrium price is located between the initial prices p1
and p2. Under this condition, the convergence speed will get slower as the distance gets larger, but the reducing
process is decelerated and has no impact on convergence.
3.2 Node Gradually Recursi
on Algorithm.
ecursion
According to the principle of price match, whether the initial price is in the 1st condition, or 2nd condition
and 3rd condition is judged by whether the positive or negative sign of the 2 difference between supply and
demand are the same, i.e., (D1－S1) (D2－ S2)<0 is the 1st condition, otherwise is the 2nd or 3rd condition. Further,
if D1<S1, it is the 2nd condition; if D1>S1, it is the 3rd condition. Besides, the expressions of condition 2 and
condition 3 during the variables’ recursive transformation are the same, so the divergent selection of judgment
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can be used to solve the problem of different initial prices.
This paper provides the node gradually recursion algorithm:
Step1
Step1. Displayed price on e-commerce platform p1, the manufacturers and distributors submit available
trade numbers S1, D1.
Step2
Step2. If | S1 － D1|< ε ( ε

is the difference between supply and demand amounts), the matchmaking

succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step3
Step3. According to the difference of S1, D1, the platform displayed the second price p2 (if S1>D1, then

p2<p1,otherwise p2>p1), and the manufacturers and distributors submit available trade numbers S2, D2.
Step4
Step4. If | S2－D2|< ε , the matchmaking succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step5
Step5. According to the 2nd expression, calculate the bargaining price p3 =

( D2 − S 2 ) p1 − ( D1 − S1 ) p2
( D2 − D1 ) − ( S 2 − S1 )

Step6
Step6. As to the displayed price p3, the manufacturers and distributors again submit available trade
numbers S3, D3.
Step7
Step7. If | S3－D3|< ε , the matchmaking succeeds, and then exit the cycle and execute step 9.
Step8
Step8. If (D1 － S1)(D2－ S2)<0, let p2=min(p1,p2), S2=min(S1,S2), D2=max(D1,D2), p1=p3, D1=D3, S1=S3, then
turn to step 5; otherwise, if(D1 － S1)(D2 － S2)>0, let p1=p2, D1=D2, S1=S2; p2=p3, D2=D3, S2=S3, then turn to step
5.
Step9
Step9. Output the bargaining price p* (the final displayed price on the platform) and bargaining amount Q*,
if there is only p1 in the price series, then p*= p1, Q*=(D1+S1)/2; if there are only p1 and p2 in the price series,
then p*= p2, Q* = ( D2 S1 − D1 S2 ) [( D2 − D1 ) − ( S2 − S1 )] ; if there are p1, p2 and p3 in the price series, then p*=

p3, Q* = ( D2 S1 − D1 S 2 ) [( D2 − D1 ) − ( S 2 − S1 )] .

4.

CONCLUSIONS
This paper proved related theorems about intersecting chords, especially the theorem that the recursive

process of intersecting chords which cross the intersection will finally converge to intersection of curves. It also
provides theoretical support for the convergence of price match, and thus it can be confirmed that concave
supply function and demand function could close a deal according to node gradually recursion algorithm.
Besides, as the recursive process of intersecting chords which cross the intersection is high order convergence,
there generally would be relatively rare times of price match before equilibrium, and both sides of the
transaction would be liable to accept and glad to participate in quoting price. Moreover, this algorithm is of
benefit for controlling cost of e-commerce platform, and it is of good practicability.
REFERENCES
[1] Dasgupta P, Das R. Dynamic pricing with limited competitor information in a multi-agent economy[C]. In Conf. on
Cooperative Information Systems( London: Springe Verlag)2000,299–310.
[2] Carvalho, Puttman M L. Dynamic pricing and reinforcement learning[EB／OL],
url:gg.nwu.edu/academic/deptprog/meds-dep/or-seminars/puterman.pdf,2003
[3] Raju CVL, Narahari Y, Kumar Ravi K. Learning dynamic prices in multi-seller electronicretail markets with price
sensitive customers, stochastic demands, and inventory replenishments[C]. In IEEE Trans. Systems,Man,Cybern.:Part
C(to appear),2005
[4] Alan Smart, Alan Harrison, Online reverse auctions and their role in buyer supplier relationships[J],Journal of Purchasing

The Twelfth Wuhan International Conference on E-Business——E-Business Management in Organization Track

229

& Supply Management 2003,9(5-6): 257-268.
[5] Smeltzer Larry R, Carr Amelia. Reverse auctions in industrial marketing and buying [J], Business Horizons,
2002,45(2):47-52.
[6] Tang Qiusheng, Niu Tingting, Ma Xianting. The Coordination Mechanism of Quantity Discounts and the Pricing Strategy
about the Closed-loop Supply Chain MeRCRM Based on Stackelberg Theory. Journal of Industrial Engineering and
Engineering Management in China, 2012.26(4):183-191
[7] He Zhigan,Dong Huailin,Wu Qingfeng,Wu Amei. Research and Design of Pricing Model of Goods in B2C
E-commerce[J].Journal of Xiamen University(Natural Sciences),2011,50(6):994-997
[8] Li Weixiang,Zhao Lindu. Research on Dynamic Pricing Base on Auction in E-commerce[J]. Journal of NanJing
University of Technology,2005,27(4): 67-70
[9] Strbel Michael. Effects of Electronic Markets on Negotiation Processes[C]. IEEE, 2000, (1):445-452.
[10] Zhang Yong. Describe on Perishable Products' Revenue and Research on Dynamic Pricing Base on the Process of
E-commerce[D]. Master Thesis of University of Electronic Science & Technology of China,2009.

